Previous research has shown that background knowledge affects the ease of concept learning, but little research has examined its effects on speeded categorization of instances after the category is well learned. Subjects in 4 experiments first learned novel categories. At test, they categorized a new set of novel stimuli that were either consistent or inconsistent with background knowledge given about the categories. Background knowledge affected categorization responses in an untimed task, with usual reaction time instructions, with a response deadline, or when the stimuli were presented for 50 ms followed by a mask. Three other experiments using a part-detection task showed that subjects were more likely to notice missing parts that were critical than noncritical according to background knowledge. The mechanisms by which background knowledge affects categorization and part detection are discussed.
Human categorization is a cognitive proceSs in which people decide whether an instance is a member of a category by comparing the instance with their conceptual representations. Categorization research in the 1970s and early 1980s primarily focused on certain issues of representation, such as whether concepts are represented by prototypes (summary representations of an entire category) or by exemplars (individual instances of the categories). Despite the differences between these models of conceptual representation, they share some common assumptions. One assumption is that concepts are collections of features; another is that categorization involves feature matching and computation of feature similarity between the instance to be categorized and the concept with which the instance is compared (see Smith & Medin, 1981 , for a review).
More recently, however, a growing number of researchers have argued that similarity computation by feature matching is insufficient to explain conceptual coherence and the nature of conceptual representation. One type of argument is that the similarity relation between an instance and a concept can vary widely across contexts, but the featurematching process used by most models cannot capture this flexibility (Murphy, 1993) . Another type of argument points to the evidence that perceptual similarity is not the sole factor that contributes to conceptual coherence; underlying beliefs about the nature of the category greatly influence coherence and category decisions (Keil, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 1989; Rips & Collins, 1993) . For example, people expect members of a biological kind to have an underlying genetic relation and artifacts of the same type to have a similar function. Thus, researchers have begun to propose that an account of concepts and categorization should specify the relations between concepts and people's theories about them. Domain theories and background knowledge are needed to explain how features are tied together to form a coherent concept and why certain features of a concept are more relevant than others in certain contexts.
Domain theories and background knowledge refer to the beliefs that people have about the interrelations and causal connections among features and concepts (Keil, 1989; Murphy, 1993) . Consider the concept car. Some relevant features of car are "has wheels," "has doors," "has windows,"
"has a metal body," "has an engine," and "transports people or goods." Background knowledge about a car would refer to causal, underlying beliefs about how various components of a car fit or work together to give rise to its function as a vehicle. A belief such as "the engine turns the wheels, enabling the car to move about, and being able to move about in turn is a critical function of a car" would be considered part of a domain theory or background knowledge. This particular belief explains the relations among features or the relative importance of features in part through an underlying cause that connects the features. Thus, if an object looks like a car but was manufactured with no engine, no gas pedal, and no transmission, people might not categorize it as a car, since nothing would enable the object's wheels to turn to fulfill a car's function. In short, one can think of domain theories or background knowledge as sets of interconnected relations that provide causal links among concepts and features. A domain theory therefore does not exist independently of its concepts, and a concept is partly defined by the theories that it enters into (Murphy, 1993) . To avoid possible confusion about the meaning of theory (within formal scientific practice), we generally use the term background knowledge (or just knowledge) in this article.
Since the emergence of the theory-based view of con-cepts, various studies have examined the relations between background knowledge and concepts. Most studies have focused on the effects of background knowledge on concept learning and on conceptual combination. Studies that have examined knowledge effects on concept learning have shown that background knowledge guides learners to infer features that are important to a concept (Wisniewski & Medin, 1994) . Furthermore, if features relevant to category membership are highlighted by i background knowledge, subjects need only a few trials to acquire the concept. If the highlighted features and feature relations do not help to separate members from nonmembers of a category, much more experience is needed to acquire the concept (Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; Pazzani, 1991; Wattenmaker, Dewey, Murphy, &Medin, 1986) . Another example of the use of background knowledge can be found in the conceptual combination literature. Studies of the interpretation of conceptual combination suggest that people use their background knowledge to determine what features are relevant to each individual concept in the combination and how the features from each concept should fit together to form a coherent, sensible unit (Hampton, 1988; Medin& Shoben, 1988; Murphy, 1988) . For example, a long word might be a word that has many syllables, whereas a long problem is a problem whose solution takes a long time (Murphy, 1988, p. 549) . The addition of features (like syllables and time needed for problem solving) to the combination is a common way in which background knowledge influences the interpretation of such conceptual combinations.
Although the influence of background knowledge on concept formation is by now well established, very few studies, if any, have examined whether knowledge affects object categorization after the category is well learned. That is, the role of background knowledge on initial category learning is well known, but how the knowledge affects the transfer or the application of the acquired concepts to categorization of new instances is not known. For example, the studies of Murphy and Allopenna (1994) , Spalding and Murphy (1996) , Pazzani (1991) , Wattenmaker et al. (1986) , and Wisniewski and Medin (1994) used as their dependent measures time to learn categories or accuracy of category formation. Even when postlearning transfer tasks were used, they typically involved lists of features rather than pictures of a complete object (e.g., Murphy & Allopenna, and Wisniewski, 1995 , tested transfer with lists of verbal phrases). Thus, none of these studies seems to have carried out an examination of object categorization in the usual sense. As we argue later, there is some reason to think that knowledge effects will not be found in a speeded visual categorization task.
Object Categorization
Categorization occurs frequently in everyday life. People are constantly exposed to objects that they have never seen before and yet categorize them as members of familiar classes--shoes, cars, dogs, and so forth. Categorization allows people to apply general knowledge to novel objects and is thus a fundamental cognitive ability (Smith & Medin, 1981) . To examine knowledge effects on categorization, we used a picture categorization task that is common in the concept literature (e.g., Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984; Murphy & Brownell, 1985; Murphy & Smith, 1982; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) . Although object naming might appear to be a simpler task, it raises troublesome issues of word retrieval and production that are avoided in the picture categorization task, where the category name is provided. Subjects in the picture categorization task see a category name followed by a picture of an object and then decide as quickly as possible whether the object belongs to the category. Thus, like everyday object categorization, the picture categorization task involves perceptual processing of an object and analysis of its category membership.
Since a large part of object categorization appears to involve perceptual processing, it is not clear whether such a process can be influenced by background knowledge that is conceptual rather than perceptual. Once the features of a concept are learned, it may not be necessary for knowledge about the features to be used in making a categorization decision. Consider again our example of the car. It does not seem necessary for someone to think about the function of wheels and windows in order to identify a car--all one has to do is to see that the wheels, windows, and so on are present. Especially if categorization needs to be performed quickly, then judging whether an object belongs to a category could be entirely based on the object's superficial similarities to the concept (as suggested by Murphy & Smith, 1982) . Any effects of background knowledge may be too slow to affect the categorization decision or the speed of the response. For example, a telephone-shaped object without a receiver or dialing mechanism may look so much like a telephone that the significance of the missing parts may not be registered until after the initial categorization decision is made.
Although there are demonstrations of high-level knowledge influencing the categorization of familiar objects, these have typically been in unspeeded, problem-solvinglike situations, using long cover stories and verbal stimuli (e.g., Keil, 1989; Rips, 1989) . One view is that this use of knowledge in categorization is "deliberative" and "analytic" in contrast to a similarity-based categorization (not using background knowledge) that is "more automatic and holistic" (Smith & Sloman, 1994, p. 385) .
There is also an empirical reason to doubt whether knowledge will affect object categorization. Lin, Murphy, and Shoben (1997) examined whether knowledge could influence the basic level of categorization (Murphy & Smith, 1982; Rosch et al., 1976) . They attempted to prime knowledge relevant to the superordinate or subordinate level in order to eliminate the superiority of basic-level categories in visual categorization. Although these manipulations did improve the speed or accuracy of categorization at the primed level, the effects were fairly small, and they never resulted in a reversal of the basic-level advantage. The basic-level advantage in visual categorization appeared quite resistant to priming of other levels. Thus, it is not at all assured that effects that are found in category learning will be found in categorization after learning, especially when the stimuli are complete objects (rather than feature lists). The speed of perceptual matching may be too fast to allow such knowledge effects to manifest themselves.
There is, however, a case to be made for the possibility that knowledge effects will be found even in a visual categorization task. Given that background knowledge can affect the ease of concept learning by inducing people to focus on certain features (e.g., Pazzani, 1991) , it is possible that background knowledge can affect the salience of features in the conceptual representation. The features highlighted by the background knowledge in the representation could then in turn affect categorization. For example, people's concept of a telephone might include features such as a receiver, a set of buttons or a rotary dial, and a main body part. Background knowledge of a telephone might make the features that are important to its function particularly salient. Thus, if an object lacks some critical features of a telephone such as a receiver or a dialing mechanism, people may not identify the object as a telephone even if it looks like one. In such a case, background knowledge would be influencing categorization.
It would not be surprising, of course, if background knowledge were used in cases in which the stimulus is unclear. For example, if one hears an animal rustling under the porch but has no other perceptual information, one must necessarily rely on one's memory and knowledge to guess what the animal might be. However, in Experiments 1 and 2 in this study, we investigated the more interesting possibility that background knowledge may influence the categorization of clearly presented, well-learned objects. In later experiments we successively limited subjects' decision or visual-processing time in order to look for knowledge effects under more demanding circumstances. It may not be surprising that knowledge influences categorization in leisurely conditions, but it is less clear that speeded decisions based on short stimulus exposure will reveal knowledge effects. Furthermore, all of our tasks could be performed using purely perceptual features, which was not the case in the animal-under-the-porch example.
The knowledge effects thatwe investigated are a type of top-down effect, but they are not identical to the kind examined in the perception or letter-word recognition literature. For example, one well-known type of top-down effect occurs when the surrounding (or preceding) context influences the identification of an object (e.g., Biederman, Mezzanotte, & Rabinowitz, 1982; Palmer, 1975) . The wordsuperiority effect is another example (see Baron, 1978 , for a review). A somewhat different type of effect is the "set effect," in which subjects are given some information about a visual stimulus prior to its presentation. For example, providing a name of a picture greatly improves the recognition of the picture (Potter, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976; see Carr & Bacharach, 1976, and Haber, 1966 , for reviews of set effects). In contrast, the top-down effects investigated in the present experiments that used the picture categorization tasks concerned the effects of beliefs and theories about an individual object's features on object identification. No scene or context was presented, nor were there different "sets" in different conditions (in all conditions, the category name was provided before the object appeared). We elaborate further on the similarities and differences between the current study and the previous studies of top-down effects in the General Discussion section. Note that we are not claiming that the effects shown here are of a radically different sort than those in the prior literature. We are, however, arguing that this particular use of knowledge has not been shown in a categorization task after categories are well learned. Furthermore, this specific type of knowledge effect has special bearing on theories of categorization.
The effect of background knowledge on categorization is theoretically important for another reason. Categorization is a basic mechanism that underlies much high-level thinking (e.g., inference making, decision making, and problem solving). High-level thinking often involves the use of background knowledge, such as information about how different features fit together coherently and meaningfully. For example, by identifying a dog that is barking viciously in a front yard, a person might use background knowledge to infer or predict that it would be dangerous to enter the yard. However, it is not clear whether the use of background knowledge can penetrate the categorization process when fast and reliable categorization needs to be achieved. That is, background knowledge might not help people to identify a clearly viewed object as a dog; it might only help them make some judgment about a dog after the dog is identified as a dog (see Murphy & Ross, 1994) . Thus, one of our purposes in these experiments was to address this question.
To verify whether background knowledge can influence categorization, we used novel stimuli in a picture categorization task in Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 6. In Experiment 1, we used an untimed categorization procedure in order to give subjects the opportunity to use any knowledge or strategy they wished. In Experiments 2, 4, and 6 we used a timed procedure with speed instructions, brief stimulus presentation, or both to examine initial categorization proCesses. In Experiments 3, 5, and 7 we used a part-detection task to further investigate the influence of this type of knowledge on a more perceptual task.
Experiment 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to determine whether background knowledge can affect unspeeded categorization. Subjects first learned several categories of novel, artificial objects. Artificial categories were used (as in much categorization research) in order to permit us to manipulate knowledge experimentally. We told subjects that the objects were made by a fictitious group of people from a different culture, who lived in the country "Quine." For each category, half of the subjects were given one interpretation of the objects and the other half were given another interpretation. We designated the interpretation learned by half the subjects as the Category A description and the interpretation learned by the other half as the Category B description. For example, Figure 1 presents the three learning exemplars that all the subjects saw for the category named "tuk." Group A subjects learned that tuks were animal-catching devices, and they were given the following description:
Quinese hunters use tuks to catch Bondu, a type of animal that people like to eat in the Quine country. To catch a Bondu with a tuk, grab the tuk at its handle (3). Once a Bondu is spotted, throw the loop (1) over the Bondu's neck and then quickly pull the string (4) at the end to tighten the loop. The cover (2) in front of the handle protects your hand from being bitten or scratched by the animal.
In contrast, Group B subjects learned that tuks were pesticide-spraying devices, and they were given the following description:
Quinese people use tuks to spray pesticides. The triangularshaped bottle (2) contains the pesticides. When (3) is unscrewed, the pesticides would flow out through the hose (4). The loop (1) is used to hang the tuk on the wall.
Note that both subject groups saw the identical pictures of the learning exemplars and that the same numbered parts were described in the two category descriptions.
The exemplars and the category descriptions were designed such that features crucial to the function of Category A were not crucial to the function of Category B, whereas features crucial to the function of Category B were not crucial to the function of Category A. For example, Feature 1 (see Figure 1 ) is important for Group A because, without the loop, the tuk cannot be used to catch the animal. However, the same feature is not as important for Group B because it is not central to the working of the tuk--its hanging function is more of a convenience. In contrast, Feature 2 is necessary for Group B's tuk because it is the part that holds the pesticide, but the same feature is not as critical to Group A's tuk because the device can still operate without a hand guard. In short, for each set of learning exemplars, the category descriptions constructed for both subject groups mentioned the overall function of the category and the specific role of each labeled part in the category. However, the importance of the labeled parts to the ~-'--I The numbers 1-4 were used to describe the parts to subjects, as explained in the text. category differed between the two descriptions. Thus, by reading different descriptions, subjects received different background knowledge about the same learning exemplars. Of course, which part is more critical to the function is not directly stated in the description. Subjects must spontaneously draw this inference and use it in categorization for it to influence the results.
After subjects learned each category by correctly recalling all the information in the category description, they saw three test items one at a time and decided whether each belonged to the category that they just learned. For each one of the items that subjects responded "yes" to, they also gave a rating to indicate how typical they thought the item was for the category. The test items for each category varied in terms of which parts were present. One of them (Consistent A) retained the crucial part of Category A while omitting that of Category B. The other (Consistent B) retained the crucial part of Category B while omitting that of Category A. The last test-item type (Control) retained the crucial part of neither category. This type was included so that subjects would make some negative categorization responses. Figure  2 presents the three types of test items for the category.
Since the two groups learned different interpretations of the same sets of objects, they should encode the objects differently and have different memory representations of them. Most important, if background knowledge influences conceptual representations, then the same perceptual features of the objects should have different degrees of importance to the two groups and may even be represented in varying degrees of detail. The effects of knowledge on the representations would then affect categorization, such that subjects would make positive categorization responses to test items that retained the crucial features and negative responses to those that lacked the features. In particular, Group A should generally respond positively to Consistent A items and negatively to Consistent B items, whereas Group B should show the opposite pattern. Both groups should respond negatively to the controls. Note that such knowledge effects on categorization could not be explained by the possibility that the knowledge-consistent items were perceptually more similar to the learning exemplars than the knowledge-inconsistent items were, since the same test items served in both consistent and inconsistent conditions: Each item was consistent with background knowledge for one group of subjects but inconsistent for the other group. The predicted effects of background knowledge should instead reflect the effects of beliefs about the importance of features or feature relations on categorization.
Method
Subjects. Twenty-four subjects from the University of Illinois were paid for their participation. Half of them were randomly assigned to Group A and half to Group B.
Materials. All learning and test items were constructed by line drawings. Eight sets of learning exemplars representing different kinds of novel artifacts were used. Each set had three different exemplars shown on the same sheet of paper, and one of the exemplars had its features labeled numerically (see Figure 1) . There were two category descriptions (Category A and Category B) for each set. Both versions used the same consonant-vowelconsonant nonsense word to label the category name, but they gave different interpretations of the objects and their parts, as described earlier. For each set, the learning exemplars and the two category descriptions were constructed so that the feature that was crucial to Category A's function was not as crucial to Category B's function, and vice versa. All the category descriptions mentioned an overall function of the category and the specific functions of all the labeled features. For each set, there were three test items. Each one was shown on a separate sheet of paper. Consistent A items omitted the crucial feature of Category B while retaining that of Category A. Consistent B items were the reverse. The control items omitted the crucial features of both categories (see Figure 2 ).
Procedure and design. Subjects were tested individually. They first studied a set of learning exemplars accompanied by a category description. They did not see the Category A or Category B labels, nor were they told that there were two interpretations of the objects. The instructions told the subjects that the objects in a set all belonged to the same category and that their goal was to memorize what the category was about. The instructions emphasized that not every member of the category would look like the exemplars and that some members would not have all the labeled features. They were reminded that this is true for categories in the real world and were given the example that not all cars have a hard top (e.g., convertibles). After subjects indicated that they had learned the category, they were asked to recall the name of the category, its overall function, and the specific functions of the labeled features while looking at the pictures but not at the category description. After correctly recalling all the information, they saw the test stimuli one at a time and verbally responded "yes" or "no" to the question of whether each belonged to the category that they had just learned. Subjects made their category decision without looking at any of the information that they had read in the learning phase. For each test item to which subjects responded "yes," they also rated how typical the item was as a member of the category on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all typical) to 7 (very typical). An experimenter recorded the responses on a data sheet.
After subjects categorized all the test items for a category, they then learned and were tested on the next category.
Each subject received a separately randomized order of the categories. The six possible orders of the three test items were randomly assigned to the eight categories, with two of the orders repeated.
Results
The main question of interest was whether Group A and Group B, which acquired different knowledge of the same learning exemplars, would respond differently to Consistent A and Consistent B test items (i.e., the two critical test items). For each subject, the percentage of positive categorization responses was calculated for each test-item type. The results were then submitted to a 2 (subject group) × 3 (test item) analysis of variance (ANOVA). The analysis showed that the critical interaction between subject group and test item was highly significant, F(2, 44) = 127.9, p < .0001. As shown in Table 1 , the interaction resulted from opposite response patterns between the two subject groups on Consistent A and Consistent B items. Specifically, Group A positively categorized more Consistent A than Consistent B items, whereas Group B categorized more Consistent B than Consistent A items. Furthermore, averaged across the two subject groups, 87% of the knowledgeconsistent items were positively categorized, whereas only 18.5% of the knowledge-inconsistent items were. (In this comparison, all items appeared in both conditions across subjects.) Thus, background knowledge had an effect on categorization. Despite seeing the same learning exemplars and learning every labeled feature in the learning exemplars, the two subject groups categorized the same test stimuli differently. The main effect of test-item type was also significant, F(2, 44) = 65.97, p < .0001. As expected, neither group gave many positive responses to the control items, which retained none of the crucial features from the two category descriptions (see Table 1 ).
The average typicality rating showed the same pattern of results as the response rate. As shown in Table 1 , Group A gave higher ratings to Consistent A than to Consistent B items, whereas Group B showed the reverse pattern. Both groups gave the lowest ratings to the controls. The ratings were not submitted to statistical analysis, however. There were markedly unequal occurrences of ratings across the test items, with very low sample sizes in some cells because subjects rated only items that they had positively categorized. 
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 showed that subjects overall gave over four times more positive categorization responses to test items that retained the crucial features than to those that did not. Specifically, given .the same critical test stimuli, subjects who learned different category descriptions categorized them differently. This difference in the response pattern was due to differences in subjects' knowledge about the importance of features to the concepts they acquired. That is, subjects apparently inferred from one description that the loop on the tuk (Figure 1 ) was critical but inferred from the other description that the loop was optional. The results of the typicality ratings were also parallel to those of the response data, where higher typicality ratings were given to knowledge-consistent items than to knowledgeinconsistent items. Thus, the implication is that given a novel object, how people categorize it is influenced by their background knowledge about the features of a concept.
It is important to emphasize that in the learning and test phases, both subject groups saw the exact same pictures of stimuli. They also learned the overall function of the categories and the specific roles of every individual feature (not just the critical ones) labeled in the learning exemplars. Thus, the differences in categorization between the two subject groups could not be due to the possibility that the perceptual correspondence between the test items and the learning exemplars was greater for one group than for the other group. Rather, the effects were due to the background knowledge that the subjects brought forth to infer the critical features of the categories. We postpone detailed explanation of the effects until the General Discussion section.
Experiment 2
The goal of Experiment 2 was to determine whether the kinds of knowledge effects found in Experiment 1 would still emerge for speeded categorization. One might argue that the effects of background knowledge will only be revealed when people slowly pace themselves in making category membership judgments (e.g., Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane, 1988) or when they are asked to justify their judgments. For example, Smith and Sloman (1994) reported a case in which categorization seemed to be based on superficial similarity except when subjects were asked to talk aloud while making their judgments, which presumably promoted thinking about deeper, theory-based relations. On this view, there should be no effect of background knowledge if subjects are required to make categorization judgments quickly, without having to explain their decisions. According to this account, performance in a speeded categorization task is likely to be solely determined by an object's surface features or perceptual information. That is, the initial categorization of an object is a simple matter of whether an object physically resembles a perceptual representation, and slow-acting knowledge may only operate after the categorization is already made.
However, an alternative hypothesis is that background knowledge can still affect speeded categorization. If background knowledge can make the relevant features of a category more salient in the conceptual representation, then this salience might influence how quickly people can verify whether an object is in a category. For example, if some features seem more central to the function or essence (Medin & Ortony, 1989) of a category, then they may receive more weight in the concept. Furthermore, background knowledge may affect categorization through a more active use of the knowledge during the categorization process. That is, there may be interactive activation between domain knowledge and feature representations such that objects that are consistent with the knowledge of a category can be identified as members faster. The exact mechanism by which knowledge might influence speeded categorization is not yet known, and we will wait until the effect is demonstrated before speculating further. In Experiment 2 we used the basic design of Experiment 1 but modified several aspects of the methodology to examine whether background knowledge can affect speeded categorization. First, we presented the picture categorization task in the test phase on a computer and emphasized speeded responding. Second, to increase the number of experimental trials, each type of test item had three different exemplars, and a fourth type of test item was added. We refer to the new type as the prototype, which had all the features labeled in the learning exemplars (i.e., prototypes had no missing parts). Third, we did not collect typicality ratings in this experiment. The remaining modifications were to the stimuli and to their descriptions; we also added a short essay questionnaire in the learning phase. In a pilot study in which the stimuli were like those in Experiment 1, background knowledge affected speeded categorization decisions, but it did not affect the reaction times (RTs). The lack of effects on RT could be due to the possibility that the perceptual discriminability of the test stimuli was overwhelming. The perceptual similarities between the test items and the learning exemplars were either very high or very low in the pilot study (and in Experiment 1), perhaps encouraging subjects to rely primarily on visual resemblance in making their decisions. If the perceptual correspondence between the test items and the learning exemplars had been less overwhelming, then the effects of background knowledge on RT might have been stronger in the pilot study.
To increase the perceptual diversity among the stimuli for Experiment 2, we replaced about half of the learning exemplars and category descriptions used in Experiment 1 with new ones. Most of the new learning exemplars were considerably more perceptually complex than the old ones. In addition, we constructed a new set of test stimuli, which looked perceptually less similar to the learning exemplars than did the test stimuli of Experiment 1. Specifically, the new test stimuli were less similar in terms of their overall shape and the relative sizes and orientations of different components (compare Figure 3 and Figure 1 ). In natural categories, there are often considerable perceptual differences between members of the same category (e.g., members of truck are perceptually heterogeneous) or as a func-Prototype Consistent A Consistent B Control Figure 3 . Examples of test items in Experiments 3 and 4. The prototype contained all the critical features; the Consistent A and Consistent B lacked a feature that was not critical to the A and B groups, respectively; and the control picture lacked both critical features.
tion of configuration or viewpoint (Tarr, 1995) . Thus, this diversity in the pictures is not an unnatural one. In addition to changes in the pictures, we modified all the stimulus descriptions as well. One concern about Experiment 1 was that the order of describing the features was not held constant across conditions. Consequently, the order of mentioning the features might have had some effect on categorization. To eliminate this possibility, we therefore described the labeled features in the same order to the two subject groups for all the stimuli.
The final methodological change was the addition of a short essay questionnaire. Unlike in Experiment 1, in the RT studies subjects learned all the categories first, and so memory of the background knowledge was an issue. In order to strengthen subjects' familiarity with the background knowledge, we had them write a short essay in response to a question for each category after they had learned and correctly recalled all eight categories. The question asked the subjects how they would maintain or take care of each kind of object so that it would function effectively. The goal of this question was to provide the opportunity for the subjects to use their background knowledge in thinking about each category.
With this design, we hoped to see knowledge effects on both categorization decisions (as in the pilot study) and RTs. Specifically, RTs for positive responses should be faster for the knowledge-consistent items than for the knowledgeinconsistent items. In contrast, RTs for the negative responses should be slower for the consistent items, since knowledge suggests the opposite response.
Method
Subjects. Twenty subjects from the University of Illinois were paid for their participation. Half of them were randomly assigned to Group A and half to Group B.
Materials. Three of the eight sets of the learning exemplars used in Experiment 1 were replaced with new sets. Each set still had three learning exemplars shown on the same page, and one of those had features labeled numerically. The category descriptions in all the stimulus sets were modified such that both versions described the labeled components in the same order. For the test items, a new type called the prototype was added. Prototypes included all the components labeled in the learning exemplars. However, the shapes and sizes of their components were slightly modified so that they were not identical to any of the learning exemplars. For the remaining test-item types (i.e., Consistent A, Consistent B, and control), new stimuli were constructed in order to increase their perceptual dissimilarities to the learning exemplars. For example, instead of the straight lines and perfect circles of the learning exemplars in Experiment 1, curves, wavy shapes, and irregular ellipses were used here. Each test-item type had three different exemplars. All the exemplars were constructed as line drawings first and then scanned and converted into PCX files. A PC using MEL software controlled the picture categorization task.
Procedure and design. The procedure of the learning phase was the same as that in Experiment 1 except for the following. Subjects did not recall category information (as a check on learning) until they had learned all eight categories. The order in which they learned the categories and the order in which they recalled the categories were both randomized for each subject. If subjects incorrectly recalled any of the specified information for a given category, they were asked to relearn the category after the recall test. After they relearned the category or categories, they were tested again. The learning phase continued until all the categories were correctly recalled. After the learning phase, subjects completed a questionnaire in which they were asked how they would maintain or take care of each kind of object so that the objects would function effectively. Subjects wrote their answers in the space near each category label printed on the questionnaire. They were allowed to look at the pictures of the learning exemplars but not at the category descriptions when doing this task.
After completing the questionnaire, subjects performed the speeded picture categorization task. The instructions told them that they would see new pictures of objects that would not look exactly like the ones they had seen in the learning phase and that their goal was to use what they had learned earlier to decide whether these objects belonged to the categories. The instructions provided a watch example to illustrate subjects' task. The example presented a picture of an analog watch as a learning exemplar where the tick marks and hands were labeled. Sample test items shown were a digital watch and another item that looked like the analog watch except that there were neither tick marks nor hands. The instructions pointed out to the subjects that even though the digital watch did not have all the features labeled in the analog watch, it would still be categorized as a watch, but the other test item would not.
On each trial of the picture categorization task, the computer presented a category name written in capital letters (e.g., TUK) for 1 s. Immediately afterward, a picture of an object appeared on the screen. Subjects used their dominant hand to press the button labeled YES if they thought the object belonged to the category, or they used their other hand to press the button labeled NO if they thought the object did not belong to the category. These two response buttons were the / and z keys on the keyboard. When a subject pressed one of the buttons, the picture disappeared from the screen, and then the next trial began after 1 s. The computer recorded subjects' responses and RTs, measured from the onset of the picture. Subjects were told to respond as quickly as possible while keeping errors to the minimum.
Each test item was paired with the name of the category that it was derived from once, yielding a total of 96 trials (i.e., three items in each of the four test-item types for eight categories). These trials were randomized separately for each subject. Prior to the experimental trials, subjects performed 12 practice trials using geometric shapes to familiarize themselves with the procedure. Table 2 presents the average percentage of positive responses as a function of subject group and test item. The results showed that both subject groups responded similarly to the prototypes and the controls but responded in opposite fashion to Consistent A and Consistent B items. Averaged across the two groups, the percentages of positive responses for knowledge-consistent and knowledge-inconsistent items were 72% and 26%, respectively. The interaction between subject group and test item was significant in the complete analysis, F(3, 54) = 43.79, p < .0001, and also in the analysis of just the critical (Consistent A and Consistent B) items, F(1, 18) = 111.97,p < .0001. Hence, as in the pilot study, background knowledge affected speeded categorization decisions. The main effect of test item was also significant, F(3, 54) = 156.32, p < .0001. The average percentage of positive responses was highest for the prototypes (see Table 2 ), lower for Consistent A and Consistent B items, and lowest for the controls.
Results
Reaction times greater than 10 s (which occurred in five trials) were excluded from the RT analysis, and the resulting data were analyzed separately for positive and negative categorization responses. For the positive responses, the RTs were submitted to a 2 (subject group) × 3 (test items) ANOVA that excluded the control items because of some empty cells (i.e., some subjects did not make any positive responses to the controls). Figure 4 illustrates the results. Consistent with the prediction, Group A's mean RT was 356 ms faster for Consistent A than Consistent B items, whereas Group B's mean RT was 711 ms faster for Consistent B than Consistent A items. (Note the crossover interaction evident in the right two columns of Figure 4 .) Subjects' positive categorization responses were overall 534 ms faster in the knowledge-consistent than in the knowledgeinconsistent conditions. The interaction between subject group and test item was indeed significant in both the complete analysis, F(2, 36) = 3.62, p < .04, and in the analysis of just the critical (Consistent A and B) items, F(1, 18) = 6.09, p < .03. The main effect of test item was also significant, F(2, 36) = 8.36, p < .002. The mean RT for the prototypes (M = 1,721 ms) was faster than the mean RTs for the Consistent A (M = 2,506 ms) and the Consistent B items (M = 2,329 ms).
Results for the negative categorization responses were also analyzed in the same way except that the prototypes were excluded from the analysis because of empty cells (only 4% of its responses were negative). Figure 5 shows the expected interaction between subject group and test items. Group A was 633 ms slower to reject the membership of Consistent A than Consistent B items, whereas Group B was 231 ms slower to reject the membership of Consistent B than Consistent A items: F(2, 36) = 5.16, p < .02, in the complete analysis; F(1, 18) = 10.12, p < .006, in the analysis of just the critical items. (Note the crossover interaction evident in the left two columns of Figure 5 .) Hence, subjects were overall 432 ms slower to reject the membership of knowledge-consistent items, which is consistent with the prediction. The main effect of test item was also significant, F(2, 36) = 22.7, p < .0001. The mean RT for the controls (M = 1,457 ms) was much faster than the mean RTs for the Consistent A (M = 2,332 ms) and the Consistent B items (M = 2,130 ms), as expected.
Discussion
Not only did background knowledge affect categorization choice as it did in Experiment' 1 and in the pilot study, it also affected the RT of the categorization response. Specifically, affLrming category membership of knowledge-consistent objects was faster than affirming the membership of knowledge-inconsistent objects; disconfLrming the membership of knowledge-consistent objects was slower than disconfirming the membership of knowledge-inconsistent objects. The results therefore suggest that the categorization decision, whether or not it is being timed, is not solely based on how perceptually similar an object is to members of a category previously encountered. If it were, then the two groups who saw the same learning exemplars and test Although it is not central to our thesis, an important result is that Experiment 2 demonstrated the usual typicality effect: Prototypes were most likely to be identified as category members and had the fastest RTs. Thus, subjects' apparent use of knowledge did not prevent the familiar similarity-based effects from also appearing.
It is important to emphasize again that the argument is not that perceptual features are unimportant in a picture categorization task or even absent in conceptual representation. In fact, perceptual features clearly play an important role in object categorization, which was why (a) this experiment used a more heterogeneous set of stimuli to elicit stronger knowledge effects and (b) categorization responses were consistently highest for the prototypes and lowest for the controls. What the results show is that object categorization, a task that involves perceptual analysis of an object's features and matching them with the features represented in a concept, can still be influenced by background knowledge about an object's function and properties.
Experiment 3
Given that background knowledge can influence speeded picture categorization, we questioned whether it could also influence a perceptual identification task, or the way people attend to an object's perceptual features. A recent study by Goldstone (1994) suggested that knowledge of category membership can have such an effect (see also Goldstone & Pevtzow, 1994) . Goldstone found that people who learned different categories for the same set of stimuli subsequently made different perceptual discriminations of the stimuli. For example, subjects who learned to differentiate two categories according to either the size or brightness dimension were subsequently more accurate at discriminating different sizes or brightness levels, respectively, than were the control subjects who learned no categories. The results furthermore showed that the increased perceptual sensitivity as a result of prior category learning did not just apply to stimuli that belonged to different categories; increased discrimination also occurred with stimuli that belonged to the same category. Thus, if perceptual sensitivity can be affected by the relevance of dimensions in prior category learning, sensitivity to objects' features might also be affected by background knowledge, which can make certain features more salient or relevant to a concept (see Pazzani, 1991; Sehyns & Murphy, 1994) . Note that Goldstone's study did not involve knowledge manipulations--subjects simply learned to classify the objects according to one or another dimension (but see Wisniewski & Medin, 1994) . It is unknown, then, whether knowledge about the category might influence part identification in category members.
Subjects in this experiment first went through the identical category learning phase as the subjects in Experiment 2 did that is, half of the subjects learned categories with one set of descriptions, and half learned them with the other set of descriptions. When the subjects completed the shortessay questionnaire, they performed a part-detection task. In this task the stimuli were presented in the same way as they had been presented in the picture categorization task in Experiment 2, but subjects' task was now to determine whether each test item had all the parts labeled in the learning exemplars. For example, when subjects saw the category word TUK followed by a picture of an object, their task was to decide whether the object had all of the labeled parts shown in the learning exemplars of tuk. If a test item was the prototype, the answer would be yes because the prototype had all of the parts labeled in the learning exemplar. If the test item was Consistent A or Consistent B, the answer would be no because both types of test items lacked one of the parts labeled in the learning exemplars. To reduce the number of negative responses, we did not test the control items.
One reason that part detection is an interesting task is that the decision is a purely objective one that is not dependent on subjects' interpretation of the objects. If background knowledge affects the way people represent category informarion, and the resulting representation in turn affects how sensitive they are to the perceptual features of the category, then people with different background knowledge should have different sensitivities to features that differ in functional importance to the category. For example, one possibility is that people with different background knowledge inight pay attention to different parts of the same objects such that the functionally unimportant parts are more likely to be overlooked than are the functionally important parts. Thus, we predicted that subjects would be faster at noticing missing parts that are highlighted as functionally important by their background knowledge. For example, Group A should be fast in responding no to Consistent B items because they lack the crucial features of Group A's concepts. In contrast, Group B should be fast in responding no to Consistent A items because they lack the crucial features of Group B's concepts. Furthermore, the effects of back-ground knowledge might even be strong enough to affect the nature of the response. That is, the absence of less important or meaningful parts in the knowledge-consistent items may not even be noticed, causing more errors in the knowledge-consistent conditions.
Me~od
Subjects. Twenty subjects from the University of Illinois were paid for their participation. Half of them were randomly assigned to Group A and the other half to Group B.
Materials and procedure. All the materials used in Experiment 2 were used again here except for the control test items. The procedure was also the same as that used in Experiment 2 except that subjects performed a part-detection task in the test phase. Subjects were told that they would see a category name followed by a picture of an object on each trial and that their task was to decide whether the object had all the parts labeled in the previous objects that belonged to the category just named. They were told to press the button labeled YES if the object had all the parts and the button labeled NO if any one of the parts labeled earlier was missing from the picture. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible while minimizing errors. Before the experimental trials, there were 12 practice trials. The procedures in the practice trials were the same as those in the experimental trials. However, subjects saw pictures of geometric shapes (e.g., rectangle, triangle, etc.) instead, and they had to decide whether the shapes had any missing parts (e.g., an edge or a corner) by pressing the appropriate button.
Results
Since negative responses were the correct responses for the critical test items, the average percentage of their occurrence for each test-item type was determined for each subject. An ANOVA showed that there was a significant interaction between subject group and test item, F(2, 36) = 4.03, p < .03. Table 3 indicates that the two groups had the identical level of negative responses for the prototypes, and hence the source of interaction was the two knowledgerelated conditions, F(1, 18) = 12.59, p < .003, from the analysis of just the critical test items. Although Group A was only 1% less accurate at detecting missing labeled parts of the Consistent A items, Group B was 17% less accurate with the Consistent B items. (Apparently, Consistent B items were generally harder; see discussion below.) Overall, then, when the missing part was less important to the test item, it was noticed 9% less often than when it was important.
The main effect of test item on negative response rate was significant in the full analysis, F(2, 36) = 312.29, p < .0001. The results showed that the average percentage of negative responses was significantly lower for the prototypes than for the Consistent A or the Consistent B items (see Table 3 ). This finding was expected because the negative responses were the incorrect responses for the prototypes. The significant difference between the two critical test items presumably reflects random item differences, F(1, 18) = 8.43, p < .01, which indicates that overall, the critical parts in Group A's concepts were less noticeable than those in Group B's concepts.
We also analyzed the results using the sensitivity measure, d', from signal detection theory. For each subject, we calculated the z score of hit rate (i.e., the percent correct for the prototype) and the z score of false alarm rate for each type of critical item to calculate d's. (We substituted 99.99% for 100% accuracy and 0.01% for 0% accuracy to obtain z scores for these numbers.) The d's were then submitted to a 2 (subject group) × 2 (test item) ANOVA. Since both subject groups had the same hit rate, the pattern of d' mirrored the pattern of the percent correct results. The interaction between subject group and test item shown in Table 3 was significant, F(1, 18) = 7.86, p < .02. Overall, the mean sensitivity was greater for knowledge-inconsistent items (M = 3.33) than for knowledge-consistent items (M = 2.79) because the inconsistent items lacked the critical parts, whereas the consistent ones lacked the noncritical parts. The main effect of test item was also significant, F(I, 18) = 6.96, p < .02, suggesting that Group A's critical parts were overall harder to detect than were Group B's. These results showed that subjects who had different background knowledge about the same sets of objects clearly had different sensitivities to the objects' parts.
The main interest of the RT data was whether background knowledge would affect the speed of the negative (i.e., correct) responses to the two critical test items (i.e., whether subjects would be faster to detect missing labeled parts if the parts were functionally important to the categories than if the parts were unimportant). RTs of the negative responses were analyzed except for those that were 10 s or greater (which occurred in two trials). The data were submitted to a 2 (subject group) × 2 (test item) ANOVA (the prototypes were excluded because of empty cells). The analysis showed a slight trend of the expected pattern: For Group A, Consistent A items were only 9 ms slower than Consistent B items; for Group B, Consistent B items were 25 ms slower than Consistent A items. The interaction did not approach significance (F < 1). The main effect of test item was also nonsignificant (F < 1).
Discussion
Overall, the results showed that subjects' background knowledge affected their sensitivities to objects' parts but did not affect the speed of part detection. Given that subjects had less than 80% accuracy in most of the conditions, one might be concerned that they had misunderstood the instructions and responded yes if the test items had all of the important parts rather than all of the parts. We believe that this possibility is unlikely. First, our instructions were very clear. They explicitly told subjects to respond whether the test items had "all of the labeled parts" and that "if any one or more of the parts labeled earlier is missing," they should respond negatively. Furthermore, considering that our stimuli were novel and that some stimuli were perceptually more complex than the tuks presented in Figure 3 , the error rate is not unreasonable.
Experiments 4 and 5
Although subjects in Experiments 2 and 3 were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible in the critical tasks, they nevertheless had as much time as they needed to make a response, and the picture remained on the screen until they responded. This experimental procedure therefore raises the possibility that the pattern of the obtained results may not reflect subjects' immediate decisions. The RTs in the previous experiments for the critical test items ranged from about 1,200 to 2,700 ms, which is much slower than the mean RTs in past experiments that used natural categories. For example, the categorization RT in Murphy and Brownell's (1985) Experiment 1 was about 800 ms on average. However, it is somewhat unfair to compare the RTs in our experiments to the time to categorize natural objects, since people are more familiar with the names and the categories of natural objects. In addition, natural objects in most categorization tasks are not presented with any missing parts or with novel shapes, as they were in our studies. Nonetheless, the RTs in our studies are still quite a bit slower than the mean RT (about 760 ms) in Murphy and Smith's (1982) study, which also used artificial stimuli.
The relative slowness of responding in these experiments could therefore be due to the difficulty of categorizing with less familiar names, the missing parts, and so on. However, the slowness could also reflect the use of a conscious strategy that evaluated how well each stimulus fit with the description given in the learning phase. The question, then, is whether knowledge would have an effect on processing even before such strategies could be used. If the slow RTs were due to such a strategy, then the results found earlier would not be generalizable to the fast categorization of natural objects.
In the following experiments, we investigated whether background knowledge given in the learning phase could still have an effect on categorization and part detection if subjects were forced to respond considerably faster. In order to investigate this possibility, we instituted a response deadline that was on the same order of magnitude as the RTs in a standard categorization task. Given that our items were less familiar than natural categories are, we set a deadline slightly slower than the mean RT in studies of natural object categorization: We gave subjects only 1 s to make their responses. If they did not respond within the deadline, the computer beeped and presented a message asking them to respond faster. The rest of the experimental procedures were the same as those used in the previous experiments. In Experiment 4 we used the picture categorization task, and in Experiment 5, the part detection task. Thus, if the influence of knowledge is found only when a slower acting, conscious strategy takes place (see Smith & Sloman, 1994) , then the previous effects would not be replicated in these experiments. However, if knowledge effects were found with this procedure, they should be revealed in errors, since the deadline was less than half the mean RTs found in our previous experiments, which should force subjects to go faster than the optimum speed. Also, RTs were not fully interpretable in this task because the deadline artificially restricts response speed. As a result, we did not analyze the RT data.
Me~od
Subjects. In each experiment, 20 undergraduates from the University of Illinois participated to fulfill a course requirement. They were equally and randomly divided into two groups.
Materials and procedure. Experiments 4 and 5 used the same materials, which were identical to those in Experiment 2 except for one minor improvement in three pictures and in a category description. The procedure of Experiment 4 was identical to that of Experiment 2 except for the following changes in the picture categorization task: (a) The computer presented a prompt screen with the message "Press the space bar to begin a trial" before each trial began and (b) the picture in each trial was presented for only 1 s. When subjects responded within that time, the picture disappeared as soon as the response was made, and the prompt screen reappeared. When subjects failed to respond within 1 s, the computer simultaneously administered a beep for 500 ms and presented the message "Please respond faster!" for 800 ms. The procedure of Experiment 5 was identical to that of Experiment 4 except that the critical task was the part-detection task, which excluded the control test items, as before.
Results of Experiment 4: Categorization Task
Responses that were not made before the deadline occurred in 8% of the total trials. Subjects therefore were able to respond in time in most of the trials. In the following analyses, responses past the deadline were counted as errors (and their RTs were not recorded).
The overall mean RT for positive categorization decisions was 606 ms. Not surprisingly, subjects made more errors with the deadline procedure. For example, only 85% of the prototypes received a positive categorization response, compared with 96% in Experiment 2. Consistent with previous findings, more positive categorization responses were made to knowledge-consistent (M = 74%) than to knowledge-inconsistent items (M = 51%), as shown in Table 4 . The interaction between subject group and test item was again significant in the full analysis, F(3, 54) = 13.16, p < .0001, and in the analysis of just the critical items, F(1, 18) = 29.98, p < .0001. The pattern of the interaction showed that Group A made more positive categorization responses to Consistent A than to Consistent B items, and vice versa for Group B (see Table 4 ). The main effect of test item was also significant, F(3, 54) = 85.28, p < .0001, which again revealed the effects of perceptual similarities: Mean percentages of positive categorization responses were highest for the prototypes, lower for the critical test items, and lowest for the controls.
Results of Experiment 5: Part-Detection Task
In this experiment, the correct responses to the critical test items were negative responses. Subjects were again able to respond prior to the deadline in the majority of the trials (94%), but their accuracy was much lower with the deadline procedure (e.g., 28% error rate for the prototypes, compared with only 8% in Experiment 3). The overall mean RT of the correct negative responses was 579 ms. As Table 5 shows, the pattern of results was very similar to that of Experiment 3. Subjects overall noticed more knowledge-inconsistent items (M = 65%) than knowledge-consistent items (M = 53%) with missing parts. Specifically, the two subject groups showed different perceptual sensitivities to the missing parts of the critical test items (see Table 5 ), and this interaction between subject group and test item was significant in the full analysis, F(2, 36) = 7.7, p < .002, and in the analysis of just the critical items, F(1, 18) = 37.94, p < .0001. The main effect of test item was also significant, F(2, 36) = 65.41, p < .0001, with prototypes having the lowest percentage of negative responses. (Again, this is not surprising because negative responses to the prototypes were the incorrect responses.) The difference between Consistent A and Consistent B items was again significant, F(1, 18) = 23.42, p < .0001, presumably due to random item differences. The results of the d' analysis were also consistent with the percent correct results: There was a significant interaction between subject group and test items (see Table 5 ), F(1, 18) = 34.99, p < .0001. The average sensitivity was greater overall when critical parts were missing (M = 1.67) than when noncritical parts were missing (M = 0.74). The difference between the critical test items was also significant, F(1, 18) = 24.17, p < .0001.
Discussion
The effects of background knowledge in the previous experiments were replicated in Experiments 4 and 5 even though subjects had only 1 s to respond. The relatively high numbers of errors in both experiments suggests that subjects were performing faster than is optimal for accurate judgments. This in turn suggests that the data in these two experiments reflected subjects' initial decisions about the category membership and the presence and absence of object parts. That is, it seems unlikely that subjects were engaging in optional, slow strategies. Thus, background knowledge can influence people's categorization decisions and their sensitivity to perceptual features quite early during processing.
Experiments 6 and 7
To further demonstrate that the knowledge effects shown so far were due to initial processing rather than to strategic justifications, in the final two experiments we presented the test stimuli in the categorization and part-detection tasks for only 50 ms, followed by a mask. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible (but there was no response deadline). If the results in these experiments were still consistent with the previous results, this would be compelling evidence that background knowledge influences part detection and initial categorizations. We again predicted that any knowledge effects would be revealed in the response pattern and not in the RT given the likely high error rate with such brief presentations.
Me~od
Subjects. In each experiment, 20 undergraduates from the University of Illinois participated to fulfill a course requirement.
Materials and procedure. Experiments 6 and 7 used the same materials as did Experiments 4 and 5. A Macintosh Quadra 630 using PsyScope controlled the picture categorization and the partdetection tasks. The procedure of Experiment 6 was identical to that of Experiment 4 except that the picture in each trial was presented for only 50 ms. Immediately afterward, a mask appeared on the screen until subjects made a categorization response on the PsyScope button box. Subjects were told to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible, and their RTs were measured from the onset of the pictures. Twelve masks were randomly presented equally often throughout the task. The masks were lines and various geometric shapes juxtaposed on one another. The procedure of Experiment 7 was identical to that of Experiment 6 except that the task was the part-detection task that excluded the control test items.
Results of Experiment 6: Categorization Task
Two trials from one subject were lost because of equipment failure. Table 6 presents the average percentages of positive categorization responses. The mean response rate was 73% for the knowledge-consistent items and 43% for the knowledge-inconsistent items. Again, the two groups had the opposite response patterns for Consistent A and B items. The interaction between subject group and test item was significant in the full analysis, F(3, 54) = 25.63, p < .0001, and in the analysis of just the critical items, F(1, 18) = 39.70, p < .0001. The main effect of test item was also significant, F(3, 54) = 140, p < .0001, again showing that prototypes had the highest response rate, critical test items had lower rates, and controls had the lowest rate. Thus, knowledge effects were revealed in the response pattern.
In contrast, the RT analyses showed no interaction between subjectgroup and test item for positive responses: F(3, 54) = 1.25, p > .3, in the complete analysis; F(1, 18) = 2.52, p > .1, in the analysis of just the critical items. Nor was there an interaction for negative responses in either the complete or the critical comparison (both Fs < 1). The patterns, however, were in the expected direction. Given the high error rates with these preserltation conditions, the lack of significance in RTs is hardly surprising. The main effect of test item was also nonsignificant for positive responses in the full analysis, F(3, 54) = 1.78, p > .15, and in the analysis of just the critical items (F < 1). However, the main effect for negative responses was reliable in the full analysis, F(3, 54) = 5.52, p < .005, but not in the analysis of just the critical items (F < 1). Thus, the negative mean RTs did not differ between the Consistent A (M = 1,342 ms) and the Consistent B (M = 1,412 ms) items, and the main effect in the full analysis was due to the fast mean RT for the controls (M = 1,103 ms) and the slow mean RT for the prototypes (M = 1,664 ms).
Results of Experiment 7: Part-Detection Task
Negative responses were analyzed in this experiment because they were the correct responses for the critical test items. Table 7 shows that the pattern of results was again similar to the previous experiments: Subjects noticed missing parts more often from the knowledge-inconsistent items (M = 60%) than from the knowledge-consistent items (M = 50%). The interaction between subject group and test item was significant, F(2, 36) = 4.26, p < .03, and the interaction was again reliable when the prototypes were excluded from the analysis, F(1, 18) = 14.22, p < .002. The pattern of d's was also consistent with the percent correct results (see Table 7 ): The interaction between subject group and test item was significant, F(1, 18) = 13.64, p < .002. The mean sensitivity of part detection was greater overall for the inconsistent (M = 1.34) than for the consistent (M = 1.07) items. Thus, even when subjects had only 50 ms to view the test items, the two groups still showed different abilities at detecting the missing parts of the critical items.
The main effect of test item on percent correct was significant in the full analysis, F(2, 36) = 66.89, p < .0001, and in the analysis of just the critical items, F(1, 18) = 11.01, p < .004. The main effect was also found in the d' analysis, F(1, 18) = 10.90, p < .005. Not surprisingly, prototypes had the lowest response rate because negative responses were the incorrect responses for them. The difference between Consistent A and Consistent B items again suggests that the critical parts of Category A were more difficult to detect overall.
As expected, the mean RTs of subjects' negative responses to the critical test items revealed no interaction effect or main effect of test item (both Fs < 1). Mean RTs for the knowledge-consistent (M = 1,579 ms) and knowledge-inconsistent (M = 1,580 ms) items were virtually identical. Note. RT = reaction time.
Discussion
Knowledge effects on categorization and part detection were again replicated in the final experiments. The results of these experiments provide very strong evidence that background knowledge can affect early processing in both the categorization and the part-detection tasks. With only 50 ms to view the pictures, subjects' background knowledge was still able to influence the pattern of their categorization responses and their identification of different parts of the pictures.
In combination with the results of Experiments 4 and 5, these results suggest that the knowledge effects are not part of a slower response strategy in which subjects decide to respond positively to knowledge-consistent items but negatively to knowledge-inconsistent items. First, as mentioned earlier, this strategy would apparently not be useful in the part-detection task, since it would result in subjects not noticing the less functionally relevant parts, even though these are equally important to the task. Second, the critical interaction is a function of prior knowledge and the presence of the part in the stimulus, which was presented for only 50 ms in the last two experiments. Thus, the effect is unlikely to be explainable by a strategy that operates well after stimulus presentation. Instead, the results of Experiment 7 suggest that in the categorization task (Experiment 6), subjects may simply not have encoded the missing part when it was not relevant to their knowledge, which is why they responded positively to the knowledge-consistent items. Third, the difficulty of the task was clearly quite high both when the stimulus was presented very briefly and when response time was restricted (e.g., see the error rates in the prototype conditions). Under such conditions, subjects are likely trying to make the most accurate response they can based on the fastest available perceptual information. This is not consistent with a conscious strategy to evaluate how consistent each item is with background knowledge. Although we are arguing against a conscious decision strategy as an explanation of our results, it is certainly possible that knowledge is creating strategies of encoding the stimuli that thereby affect the response. For example, when the stimulus is presented very briefly, subjects may use the category name to activate their knowledge about the object, which in turn could cause them to focus on the relevant part. ~ As a result of this bias in encoding, the functionally less relevant part might not be encoded as well. Thus, its presence or absence would not be explicitly noticed. This type of encoding strategy, directed by knowledge of the object, might occur in real life as well as in our experiments.
General Discussion
In Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 6, we showed that people's knowledge about the roles of features in the categories they learned affected their choice of categorization responses to novel objects. If novel objects lacked features that their background knowledge highlighted as important to the functions of the categories, subjects often did not consider the objects to be members of the categories. Even when subjects were instructed to make accurate judgments as fast as possible (Experiments 3 & 6), or when they made their response within 1 s (Experiment 4), or when the stimuli were presented for only 50 ms followed by a mask (Experiment 6), subjects did not judge novel objects' category memberships solely based on their perceptual similarities to the previously learned category members. Background knowledge also affected the speed of categorization when the perceptual similarities between the novel and the old stimuli were reduced and when the response times and stimulus presentation times were not restricted (Experiment 2).
Background knowledge affected not only categorization-it also affected the detection of an object's features. When novel objects lacked features that background knowledge highlighted as functionally unimportant, subjects often failed to notice that the features were missing. This effect happened whether subjects were instructed to respond within 1 s (Experiment 5), as quickly and as accurately as possible (Experiments 3 & 7), or with only 50 ms of stimulus exposure (Experiment 7). Thus, features that are important to background knowledge appear to be more perceptually salient than features that are unimportant to the knowledge.
Though not central to our thesis, it is significant that in all the categorization experiments (a) positive categorizations occurred most frequently to prototypes and least frequently to controls, (b) the mean RT of positive categorizations tended to be fastest for the prototypes and slowest for the controls, and (c) the mean RT of negative categorizations tended to be fastest for the controls and slowest for the prototypes. Thus, we found the usual typicality effects (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) , along with the knowledge effects. These findings and the fact that we had to decrease the perceptual similarities between the new and the old stimuli to obtain knowledge effects on RTs suggest that perceptual similarities are important in categorization. Our goal was to discover the role of knowledge beyond category learning, not to diminish the role of similarity. In the following section, we discuss how the knowledge effects found in the current study are related to the previous literature and the possible mechanisms by which knowledge influences categorization and part detection.
Relation to Previous Literature
To our knowledge, these are the first data demonstrating that knowledge of the relations between features and concepts can influence speeded categorization and part detection in individually presented objects. Other demonstrations of top-down processing usually involve somewhat different situations. One situation involves contextual priming from other elements of the stimulus display. For example, Biederman et al. (1982) and Murphy and Wisniewski (1989) showed that the plausibility of a given object appearing in a scene greatly influenced people's ability to identify the 1 We are grateful to a reviewer for pointing this out.
object. Palmer (1975) combined both of these situations, showing that when a scene was presented prior to an object, it greatly influenced the identification of the subsequently presented object. Yet another situation of top-down processing involves the effects of set on object-scene recognition. Potter (1975) , for example, presented subjects with a set of pictures or names of the pictures prior to a picture identification task. The subjects' goal in the picture identification task was to report whether any of the pictures presented in the task was among the set that they saw. The results showed that people could identify the target pictures with high accuracy, even though the pictures were presented serially at the speed of 1/8-1/3 s per picture. These speeds were fast enough that immediate recognition memory after viewing the pictures (without any cue) was quite poor.
Our experiments differed from these situations in a number of ways. First, objects were presented in isolation, without any visual context that could influence their perception. Thus, the knowledge we manipulated was internal to the object, rather than involving the object's relation to other kinds of objects. Second, the knowledge we manipulated was not about an object's status as a potential target but, more specifically, was about the relations among an object's features. The effects in our experiments depended on subjects spontaneously retrieving and using the knowledge during the trial rather than cuing the knowledge prior to the stimulus presentation (as in Potter's, 1975, study) . Finally, all the subjects in every experiment viewed the same learning exemplars and test objects, so there was no task or set difference between the subject groups.
Although we are arguing that the knowledge effects shown here are not the same as those in the prior literature, we are not claiming that they are qualitatively distinct or radically different effects. In fact, there are some close analogies to set effects that are well documented in the literature. Carr and Bacharach (1976) reviewed set effects and came to the following three conclusions:
The first is that conceptual information about a stimulus becomes available very early in the course of processing. The second is that this higher-order information can guide and facilitate the processing of lower-order information, such as object identity, at least under some conditions. The third is that the possession of advance conceptual knowledge about informational needs and stimulus conditions can lead to adjustments in the relative probabilities of efficiently processing particular stimulus information. (p. 295) All three of these phenomena can be related to the current results. First, our data show that the knowledge underlying the concept becomes available early (perhaps as a result of the category name that precedes each stimulus); we found knowledge effects with speeded-response instructions, with a response deadline that was half of the usual RT, and with 50 ms of stimulus exposure. Second, this information can clearly guide the processing of lower-order information, such as part detection and "object identity" (categorization). Since part detection is an objective task that is clearly independent of the knowledge, this would seem to be a good measure of lower-order processing. Third, subjects apparently developed hypotheses about the "informational needs" of each category, as shown by the greater emphasis that they placed on the part that was essential to the category's function.
Thus, even though the present demonstrations are different from previous top-down effects, it seems likely that the same general sort of processing is occurring in the current as in the past demonstrations. As we mentioned in the introduction, the reason that the present effects are of particular interest is that they expand the demonstration of knowledge effects beyond those that have been studied in the concept literature. Given that knowledge affects the acquisition of concepts, can it affect the speeded categorization of visual stimuli? Object categorization is a fundamental aspect of concept use, and it is important to understand how it occurs.
We believe that our experiments provide strong evidence that categorization is influenced by background knowledge that highlights important features and feature relations to a concept. Given that all subjects viewed the same learning exemplars and that each test item occurred in both knowledge-consistent and knowledge-inconsistent conditions (across subjects), the evidence that it was background knowledge that influenced the responses is compelling. In contrast, other kinds of knowledge effects that have been proposed for categorization are more ambiguous. For example, it has been shown that experts differ from novices in categorization in a variety of ways (e.g., Murphy & Wright, 1984; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) . However, it is difficult to isolate the specific aspect of expertise that accounts for these differences. That is, expertise effects might be due to the experts' greater practice--more frequent and detailed experiences with individual, specific instances of the domainmrather than to their causal theories underlying the domain. In contrast, the present experiments held the exposure to the learning and test items constant and varied only the background knowledge given about the categories. Hence, the current experiments provide clearer effects of domain theories and background knowledge.
Possible Mechanisms of Knowledge Effects
There are a number of possible mechanisms by which background knowledge could have affected categorization and part detection in the current experiments. Although we did not design this study to contrast mechanisms but rather to demonstrate the effects, we will suggest some likely explanations. One possibility is that the given background knowledge primarily influences the salience or weight of the critical parts encoded in subjects' representations of the categories during learning. For example, in the tuk example shown in Figure 1 , subjects who read the description about a hunting tool may pay more attention to the loop at the top (1). This could cause this part to be represented in more detail or to receive more activation in the representation. In contrast, the subjects who read the description about a pesticide applicator could form a more salient representation of the pesticide bottle (2). On this account, then, the locus of knowledge effects is at the stage of acquiring the concept.
One less interesting interpretation of our results that also relies on encoding differences is the possibility that subjects in our experiments were simply forgetting the features that were unrelated to the function. This would explain why they did not seem to notice these missing parts as much as the critical parts. Although this would still represent a knowledge effect on categorization, the effect would not be telling us as much about on-line object categorization. Before discussing the evidence that rules out this explanation, we should point out that our effects do not depend on forgetting because the effects were still present when subjects categorized items immediately after passing the memory test for the parts in Experiment 1. In fact, subjects in all experiments first had to recall the functions of all the parts of each category before taking the categorization test. Of course, it is still possible that subjects tended to forget the parts that were interpreted as less important over the course of the categorization trials. However, there is some evidence that subjects did remember the unimportant parts. As Table 3 shows, subjects responded correctly that a part was missing about 74% of the time in the consistent conditions. The prototype condition was identical to this condition except that the unimportant feature was added. Thus, if subjects were generally forgetting the noncritical feature, the prototype condition should produce results similar to those of the consistent condition. In reality, subjects responded that a prototype was missing a part for only 8% of the time, indicating that they were quite sensitive to the presence of the noncritical feature. Thus, these considerations suggest that forgetting the unimportant feature is not primarily responsible for the observed effects.
A more interesting possibility is that the knowledge about the labeled parts is explicitly encoded and, in addition, actively used in some way during categorization and part detection. That is, perhaps viewing the category name and the test item activates the functions of the entire object and the labeled parts. The part that is central to the object's function obtains a greater weight from its connection to the function via interactive activation and so has a greater influence on categorization and part-detection judgment. In this case, background knowledge is involved not only in forming the initial representation (affecting the salience of features) but also in making the actual decision by means of spreading different amounts of activation to different parts. Whether knowledge is actively involved in the decision process or only affects the initial feature representation cannot be distinguished by the present data. Future work will have to attempt to distinguish possible mechanisms.
One could argue for an even more active role of background knowledge that is consistent with stronger claims of top-down perception (see Haber, 1966 , for a discussion). For example, perhaps background knowledge actively influences the formation of perceptual representations of the stimuli while they are presented in the categorization and the part-detection tasks. (This might be more likely when category names preceded the objects' presentation, as in our experiments, than when objects appear without any names.) Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that what people identify as a "part" of an object can depend on their experiences with the object's category (Schyns & Murphy, 1994) . However, it does not seem necessary to posit such a strong claim at this point. Even the part-detection task can be explained largely through differences in the memory representations of the categories rather than through knowledge penetrating the formation of perceptual representations.
It is possible that a more complex combination of these possibilities is occurring. For example, subjects with different knowledge could have seen the objects differently or focused their attention on different components, which could be especially important in the part-detection task. Thus, knowledge could be influencing attentional strategies that affect the encoding of the test stimuli. In this way, knowledge effects can be direct (determining salience of a part in the conceptual representation) as well as indirect (determining stimulus encoding strategies). Our results cannot confirm any one of these accounts. What they can do is to demonstrate that knowledge of feature relations does have sizable effects on categorization and part detection.
